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The Shadow Value of Employer-Provided Training 
 
This paper adopts an equivalent income approach to calculate the economic 
value of training activities for workers. Using econometric regression analysis 
of individual self-reported job satisfaction (JS) and data from the European 
Community Household Panel dataset (ECHP), the paper shows that 
employer-provided training exerts a positive and significant effect on JS. On 
average, this effect is equivalent to a 17.7% increase in labour earnings. Boes 
and Winkelmann’s (2009) Generalized Ordered Probit for panel data is used 
to show that the determinants of JS as well as the equivalent income of 
training differ across the JS distribution. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Understanding the determinants of workers’ job satisfaction has become of core interest to 
human resource managers and governments concerned with designing optimal 
organizational policies. Job satisfaction is positively related to a number of labour market 
outcomes, including wage growth (Clark, 1999), productivity and establishment 
performance (Judge et al., 2001), absenteeism (Wegge et al., 2007) and quits (Clark, 2001, 
Frijters et al., 2007, Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2007). From a general perspective, 
moreover, job satisfaction emerges as one of the most important domains of overall life 
satisfaction and happiness (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). Indeed, recent research has 
shown that employees with higher job satisfaction tend to be healthier (Fischer and Sousa-
Poza, 2009).  
 
This paper investigates the contribution of employer-provided training to job satisfaction 
(JS). Training is an important mechanism for developing and retaining a productive 
workforce in that it gives workers new opportunities to develop skills and competencies, 
fulfil career development goals, achieve professional success and strengthen emotional 
attachment to the firm. To date, however, we still have a poor idea of how and to what 
extent training activities are appreciated by workers, how workers process these events, and 
how they transform these opportunities into well-being in the workplace. The number of 
studies in the field is very limited. The existing research has been conducted at the firm 
level and within specific occupations, which comes at the cost of representativity. 
Georgellis and Lange (2007) is a notable exception as they make use of a large-scale dataset 
to provide a broader view on the subject. Using three waves (1989, 1993, 2000) of the 
German Socio-economic Panel, they report a positive relationship between firm-sponsored 
training and JS. However, they do not make full use of the dataset’s panel structure and 
present results that are based on pooled regressions. More recently, Jones et al. (2009) have 
used cross-sectional data drawn from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS) to examine how employer-provided training contributes to a number of job-related 
outcomes and specific domains of JS. Their results uncover a positive relationship between 
training and most of the selected indicators. However, using the same dataset but 
controlling for workplace heterogeneity Haile (2009) finds a much looser relationship. 
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The first contribution of this paper is to assess the impact of training activities on JS by 
means of panel estimation. There are various sources of bias associated with cross-
sectional micro data. First, neglecting unobserved heterogeneity may result in biased 
estimates, insofar as personality traits such as extraversion, neuroticism, optimism and 
self-esteem have been found to be correlated with self-reported measures of satisfaction 
(Diener and Lucas, 1999, Judge et al., 2002). Second, a common concern arising with this 
type of estimation is that the correlation between two specific variables (e.g., training and 
JS) does not necessarily reflect causality. That would be the case if, for example, more 
satisfied workers are more likely to engage in training activities in the job. In that case, the 
estimated coefficient would not reflect benefits from being trained, but merely a reverse-
causality problem. To deal with these issues, this paper uses panel estimation with 
individual time-invariant effects. This allows us to establish causal relationships by 
following people over time and investigating how the JS of the same people changes when 
they take part in training schemes. Moreover, panel estimation is intended to control for 
individual effects, thereby addressing the unobserved heterogeneity issue. We use the 
1994-2001 Spanish waves of the European Community Household Panel dataset (ECHP); 
a survey of representative households and individuals containing a host of personal and 
labour market characteristics. Although the ECHP is not the most up-to-date dataset 
available in the profession, nor has the most extensive information on training activities at 
the firm level, the survey’s eight-wave panel structure makes it appealing for our research 
purposes.  
 
As a second contribution, the paper provides pioneering estimates of the subjective value 
that workers attribute to training activities. Well-being equations can be used to 
empirically obtain indifference curves in terms of the various dimensions that are relevant 
to evaluating well-being. By establishing trade-offs between selected variables, these 
curves can go a long way towards assessing the economic value and cost of a variety of 
items that are relevant for economic policy (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag, 2002, van 
de Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007, Verhaest and Omey, 2009). Using responses to JS, 
this paper calculates the trade-off ratio between training and labour income. This ratio is an 
appraisal of the income variation that is needed to affect JS to the same extent as 
participation in training does. This exercise must be put into perspective by noting that 
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previous studies on training typically focus on objective labour market measures including 
productivity, wages and promotions, among others. Although crucial for evaluating the 
effectiveness of training programmes, these variables may not be the only or even the most 
important ones. Objective measures may be obscured if workers with different occupations 
and employers have different opportunities to reap the benefits of the productivity gains 
associated with training. Moreover, objective indicators may be poorly correlated with 
well-being in the job which, arguably, is one of individuals’ major concerns and one of the 
most relevant aspects in one’s life. As regards objective indicators, self-reported 
satisfaction may be a more relevant measure for workers and a better indicator of the true 
benefits that they reap from training activities. This paper therefore proposes an alternative 
approach for estimating the economic value of private sector training. 
 
Finally, the number of papers investigating the causes and correlates of job-specific and 
overall life satisfaction has grown in recent years1. It is common in the literature to assume 
that if a labour-related or personal condition leads to satisfaction, such conditions would 
necessarily lead to dissatisfaction when absent and vice versa. However, there are reasons to 
believe that more complex effects might be at work. First, we know from the psychology 
literature that subjective measures of satisfaction are a construct of various pleasant and 
unpleasant emotions, with the specific mechanisms that give rise to each being largely 
independent (Schmukle et al., 2002, Larsen and Prizmic, 2008). Second, Boes and 
Winkelmann (2009) have recently found that the relationship between well-being and 
family income is not symmetric, with income being a more important source of negative 
well-being (when low) than of positive well-being (when high). Finally, and turning to the 
scope of the present paper, Herzberg (1966, 1987) describes in his two-factor model that 
certain characteristics tend to be consistently related to job satisfaction (motivators) and 
others to job dissatisfaction (hygiene factors). Factors having the potential to lead to job 
dissatisfaction tend to provide the basic conditions needed for satisfaction in normal work 
environments. If not adequately provided, they contribute to dissatisfaction with work life. 
These factors act as dissatisfiers because they determine whether the worker is dissatisfied 
                                                 
1 In the task, some authors have put the focus on age (Clark et al., 1996), gender (Clark, 1997), personal and relative 
income (Clark and Oswald, 1996, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005), self-employment (Benz and Frey, 2004), overeducation 
(Verhaest and Omey, 2009), performance-related pay (Green and Heywood, 2008) and part-time work (Booth and van 
Ours, 2009). 
 5
or not. In turn, factors having the potential to lead to job satisfaction are motivators because 
when such factors are present, individuals tend to feel satisfied with their work. When 
absent, they do not feel satisfied, but not necessarily dissatisfied either. These factors act as 
satisfiers because they determine whether the worker is satisfied or not.  
 
This paper explicitly differentiates between satisfiers and dissatisfiers in the job by 
exploiting Boes and Winkelmann’s (2009) Generalized Ordered Probit (GOP, henceforth) 
for panel data. The main advantage of this approach is that it discriminates the impact that a 
given covariate has on the dependent variable (JS) in different segments of the outcome 
distribution. In standard ordered response models, the trade-off between two specific 
covariates is assumed to be constant across outcomes, thus assuming that those factors that 
put a worker in the upper range of the satisfaction distribution are the same as those that put 
a worker in the lower range of the distribution. Most papers in the field are based on this 
assumption and consequently describe the relationship between reported well-being and the 
variable of interest only in an ‘average’ sense. However, there may be asymmetric effects 
on measured JS if for example income increases do not lead to higher satisfaction but 
income losses result in dissatisfaction. Similarly, workers may interpret the lack of training 
opportunities as a signal of non-compliance by the firm. This signal may be more intense 
among workers who are already dissatisfied with their job than among workers whose job 
and attachment to the firm is challenging and intrinsically rewarding. In this case, training 
would act as a dissatisfier rather than a satisfier, with a similar line of reasoning applying to 
other dimensions. This paper examines the extent of these asymmetries by conducting a 
separate investigation of the determinants of low and high JS. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and provides summary 
statistics of relevant demographic and labour market variables. Section 3 presents the GOP 
model, outlines its main features, and introduces the equivalent income concept used 
throughout the paper. Section 4 presents the results and documents existing asymmetries in 
the determinants of JS. The estimates are used to infer the shadow value of different types 
of training. Section 5 discusses the results and the robustness of the estimates. Section 6 
contains the concluding remarks and several policy implications arising from the analysis. 
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2. Data and definition of variables  
 
The data is extracted from the 1994-2001 waves of the Spanish sample of the European 
Community Household Panel. The dataset and the variables are described in Appendix A. 
We wish to avoid conflating work-related or ‘continuing training’ with initial vocational 
education or training. To do so, we exclude individuals under 23 years of age, paid 
apprentices, and those on special employment-related training schemes from our analysis. 
Our estimating sample consists of private sector men who are between 23 and 60 years 
old, working normally between 15 and 70 hours a week, and not employed in the 
agricultural sector. Self-employed individuals, as well as those whose main activity status 
is paid apprenticeship, training, and unpaid family workers have been excluded from the 
sample. The case of women is disregarded on account of the extra complication of 
potential selectivity bias. After dropping observations with missing values, these exclusion 
restrictions leave us with a total of 17,632 observations.  
 
2.1 Definition of training 
 
The central question in the ECHP concerning training is  
 
• (Q1) ‘Have you been in education or training since January last year?’ 
 
Whether such participation effectively occurred in a general/higher education setting or a 
vocational/training course is answered in another question. Since our focus is on training, 
we disregard activities regarded as ‘general/higher education’2. The second training 
question is  
• (Q2) ‘Was the vocational education course paid or organized by the employer?’ 
 
Given its implications for managerial and human resource policies, we use the information 
reported in Q2 to differentiate between i) employer-provided training (EP) and ii) training 
not provided by the employer (NEP). This is our Classification 1 of the training activities. 
                                                 
2 Only 2.2% of the sample workers reported this category.  
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The ECHP does not contain information on the number of training events in which 
individuals took part. However, it does provide information on the number of weeks 
training lasted (less than 2 weeks, 2 to 9 weeks, and more than 9 weeks), and on whether 
training was attended on a part-time or a full-time basis. This information allows us, at 
least partially, to take into account the role of training intensity. To that end, we construct 
two alternative classifications. First, we combine the information provided in Q2 with the 
information on either part-time or full-time attendance to define four categories of training: 
i) EP attended on a full-time basis; ii) EP attended on a part-time basis; iii) NEP on a full-
time basis; and iv) NEP on a part-time basis. This is our Classification 1A. Second, we 
split EP and NEP activities depending on whether they are short term (less than 9 weeks) 
or long term (more than 9 weeks). This gives rise to Classification 1B: i) long-term EP; ii) 
short-term EP; iii) long-term NEP; and iv) short-term NEP3.  
 
Table 1 (Classification 1A) and Table 2 (Classification 1B) report summary statistics of 
the incidence of the different types of training. We find that 13.4% of the individuals in the 
sample engaged in some type of training. About seven out of ten of these activities were 
organized by the employer (9.2%). Most training activities were attended on a part-time 
basis (8.6% vs. 4.8% on a full-time basis). This pattern is independent of whether or not 
the training was provided by the employer. Table 2 shows that long-term training 
programmes (8.7%) were more prevalent than short-term ones (4.7%). 
 
2.2 Job satisfaction 
 
The empirical analysis is based on a subjective, self-reported measure of JS. The ECHP 
asks respondents to report their level of overall satisfaction in their main work or activity 
using a 6-point Likert scale. As only 3.0% of the sample reports the lowest satisfaction 
level, we regrouped responses 1 and 2 into a single category and used a modified 1-5 scale 
(with 1 being “not satisfied at all” and 5 being “fully satisfied”).  
 
The ECHP contains a number of complementary questions inquiring about facet-specific 
                                                 
3 We do not pursue a single classification with 8 different training categories to avoid problems of small cell size in the 
regressions stage of the paper.  
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satisfactions in the job, including satisfaction with earnings, job security, type of work, 
number of working hours, working times, working conditions and distance to the 
workplace. For reasons of space, however, these domains are not considered in the present 
paper, which focuses exclusively on overall JS. 
 
Self-reported data has been periodically criticized on the grounds that they are subject to 
contextual influences. Behind the self-reported information lies an affective and cognitive 
assessment that, admittedly, may depend on a number of distorting factors related to 
individual differences including cognitive ability, personality traits, circumstances, 
aspirations and comparisons with others. If these factors are important, subjective 
measures of satisfaction may contain some noise relative to the signal value (true utility), 
and the resulting estimations should be interpreted sceptically. However, much research in 
the field of psychology and economics has demonstrated that the influence of these factors 
is limited, and that self-reported data pass a number of validation tests. First, there is 
consistent evidence that subjective measures of satisfaction and well-being are related (and 
in the expected direction) to a number of objective indicators including physical health and 
longevity (Danner et al., 2001), suicide rates and macroeconomic fluctuations (Di Tella et 
al., 2003) and unemployment (Clark et al., 2008). Secondly, subjective measures of 
satisfaction show a reasonable amount of internal consistency and temporal reliability: 
they correlate well with one another and with alternative methods of measurement, 
including ratings made by family and friends, facial measures of emotion and a vast array 
of psychological and psychosocial indicators (Cacioppo et al., 2008). Thirdly, and turning 
to the crux of our investigation, were self-reported JS mere noise then it should be 
independent from other indicators that are directly related to internal satisfaction. Still, as 
mentioned above, self-reported JS is related in a meaningful way to productivity, 
establishment performance, absenteeism and job turnover. 
 
2.3 Summary statistics 
 
Table 3 uses the pooled sample to report summary statistics by levels of JS. For the sake of 
simplicity, we consider only Classification 1 of the training activities. The first column 
contains the variables that will later be included in the regressions. The first row shows 
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that most individuals are fairly satisfied with their jobs, with almost 50% of the sample 
reporting a satisfaction level above 3 and only 9.64% reporting the lowest satisfaction 
category. 
 
-------------------- Insert Table 3 about here ------------------- 
 
The first column of statistics refers to the total sample. In our data, 25.5% and 19.6% of 
the employees have, respectively, tertiary and upper secondary education, while 14.1% 
works in the public sector and 10.3% plays a supervisory role in the job. The average 
working load stands at 41.8 hours per week, and the sample average age is 40.0 years. 
Most individuals have less than five years of tenure (46.7%), although 39.9% has worked 
in the same firm for ten years or more. More than half of the sample has a permanent 
contract (60.4%). Singles and immigrants account for 27.8% and 1.4% of the sample, 
respectively. Some 16.3% of the employees report bad health, while a substantial fraction 
has experienced unemployment spells (36.3%). Almost 50% of the sample receives health 
care or medical insurance from the employer, while an additional 3.6% receives housing.  
 
Differentiating between levels of JS permits important differences to emerge in terms of 
demographic and job characteristics. More satisfied workers are more prone to be older, 
report higher wages, have tertiary education, a supervisory role, more tenure, a permanent 
contract, work in the public sector and in a larger firm. On the other hand, they are less 
likely to be single, report bad health or have experienced unemployment spells. In most 
cases, differences in the summary statistics among workers with JS=1 and JS=5 are 
remarkably large. Interestingly, as we move towards higher levels of JS, the incidence of 
EP training tends to increase from 4.1% at the bottom of the satisfaction scale to 11.0% at 
the top. In turn, the proportion of workers with NEP training is roughly similar across JS 
levels. Although this evidence is based on raw statistics and unconditional relationships, it 
provides preliminary support for the hypothesis that EP training is positively associated 
with JS.  
 
In order to provide a complementary view, in Figure 1 we depict the frequency distribution 
of JS differentiating between three groups of workers according to whether they have EP 
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training, NEP training or no training at all. JS scores are more skewed to the left among 
workers with EP training. About 62% of the individuals in this group report either JS=4 or 
JS=5, while only 15% reports a satisfaction level below 3. In the other two groups, these 
figures are more similar, with some 48% in the two top categories and about 26% in the 
two lowest categories.    
 
-------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------------------- 
 
3. The model 
 
Individual JS is assumed to be a function of a latent variable JS* that is not measured. This 
variable is continuous, has several threshold points that determine the observed value of JS, 
and is a function of observable characteristics 
 
 
 
where i indicates the individual, t indicates the time and X is a vector with K-1 explanatory 
variables. We allow for individual correlation over time by splitting the error term into 
itiit ηνε += , where  νi is an individual time-invariant effect and  ηit is an independent error 
term. Our reference model is the ordered probit with individual random effects where 
 )1, 0N( ),0N( 2 ∼∼  η   ,σ ν itνi , 0),Cov ( =iti η ν . In this setting, it is assumed that the error 
terms are not related to the explanatory variables, which may not be plausible given the 
potential correlation between individual unobservable characteristics (such as personality 
traits) and the right-hand side variables. To address this issue, we introduce a Mundlak 
(1978) correction term in which the individual random effect is modelled as a function of 
the mean values of selected time-varying regressors, i
M
ii uXν +γ= , where  ui is a pure error 
term and MiX  is a vector with the time-averaged values of a subset of M variables, M < K,  
included in X. Eq. (1) can be rewritten as 
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where the link between JS and JS* is given by j
*
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being the number of possible outcomes and ∞=<<=∞− J10 δδδ ... .  
 
The Ordered Probit (OP, henceforth) is probably the most widely-used method for the 
economic analysis of job-satisfaction and overall well-being. Moreover, the OP yields 
estimates that are similar to other models based either on the cardinality or on the 
ordinalization of the dependent variable4. Given this representativity, and for purposes of 
comparison, the results of the OP model will be reported throughout the paper. We must 
note that, in this case, the relationship between JS* and the explanatory variables is assumed 
to be constant, thus yielding a unique vector of estimates β. 
 
In turn, Boes and Winkelmann’s (2009) GOP model yields J different vectors of 
coefficients. This is done by allowing the ancillary parameters to depend on the model 
covariates, j
M
ijitjj γXβXδδ ~
~ ++= . In this case, the probability of outcome j is given by  
 
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. The coefficients related to outcome j are 
jj β β β
~−=  and jj γ γ γ ~−= , where β and γ  are the corresponding vectors in the OP model. 
The impact of a particular covariate k on the probability of outcome j (i.e., the marginal 
probability effect or MPE) is then 
 
 
                                                 
4 Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) compare different methods to evaluate subjective ordered responses, including 
OP, Probit-adapted OLS (POLS), Cardinal Probit (CP) and Cardinal OLS (COLS). Using a parsimonious well-being 
equation, they report that “the trade-off ratios and t-ratios are almost the same in all four approaches OP; POLS; CP and 
COLS” and argue that the four methods are practically equivalent (pp. 36). Similarly, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 
(2004) show estimation results for self-reported happiness that are qualitatively identical (in terms of direction, 
significance, and trade-offs among regressors) when assuming either cardinality or ordinality, although the fixed-effect 
ordered logit model exhibits particular features as compared to the other models. 
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 12
where φ is the normal density function, kx  is the k-th element of vector X  and kj,β  is the k-
th element of vector βj. The main feature of this approach is, therefore, that it does not 
impose a constant ratio of MPEs across outcomes of the dependent variable. This 
refinement allows the relative importance of the different covariates to vary across the JS 
distribution5.  
 
3.1 Right-hand side variables  
 
We pose that JS is a function of personal and job characteristics. The first set of variables 
includes completed education, age (and squared), singlehood, immigrant status, health 
condition, unemployment experience and household size. The job variables include net 
monthly labour earnings, public sector, supervisory role in the job, working hours, tenure, 
type of contract and firm size. Additionally, we include controls for industry and 
occupation. To account for non-linear effects, age, household size, labour earnings and 
working hours are entered in their natural logarithm form. In order to account for other 
sources of compensation in the job, we additionally include two indicators of whether the 
individual receives housing and medical insurance from the employer. Finally, the set of job 
characteristics includes the core feature of our analysis: training. The benchmark 
specification, which is based on Classification 1, consists of two training dummies 
controlling for EP and NEP training, respectively.  
 
Apart from the full set of controls, the estimating equation includes year fixed effects and 
the Mundlak correction term MiX . This term must contain representative information of the 
individual in order to account for the potential correlation between the individual random 
effect and the observable characteristics. Although the choice of these variables is 
somewhat discretionary, the literature has shown a preference for information related to 
income, family size and hours of work (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). We follow this view and 
                                                 
5 In the OP model, for example, Eq. (4) collapses to: 
ki
M
iitjki
M
iit1-jkj )βu-γX-βX -φ(δ -)βu-γX-βX -φ(δ)(xMPE =  
and, consequently, the relative impact of any two distinct covariates k and p is constant across outcomes 
pkpjkj ββ)(xMPE)(xMPE = , for all j=1,…,J. 
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expand our estimating equation by adding the (individual) time averaged value of three 
variables: monthly labour earnings, household size and working hours.  
 
3.2 The equivalent income concept 
 
Well-being and satisfaction equations can be used to assess the importance of a given 
dimension relative to other dimensions, and to construct equivalence scales between 
relevant variables. We will centre our analysis on the impact that training has on JS, using 
labour income as a reference scale. Although other variables can be used, employing 
income as a reference measure provides a clear-cut interpretation. This equivalent income 
approach is very similar to the one used in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag (2002), van de 
Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007) and Verhaest and Omey (2009) to estimate the shadow 
value/cost of informal medical care, chronic diseases and educational mismatches, 
respectively. 
 
Consider the impact that training participation has on the probability of observing outcome 
j. The equivalent income of training is defined as the percentage increase in earnings needed 
to change the probability of outcome j to the same extent, 
 
 
where w is labour earnings, tr is training and ∆w  is the equivalent income. For the sake of 
simplicity, the remaining variables are omitted from the notation. In terms of MPEs, the 
above condition implies that ceteris paribus, and for each outcome j, the equivalent income 
of training is given by the equation (ln(w))MPE∆ln(w)(tr)MPE j
j
j ⋅= . Taking into account 
that )∆wln(1∆ln(w) jj += , we obtain our equivalent income formula 
 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Table 4 reports the first set of estimates. These are expressed in terms of Eq. (4): the 
)6(                                                           1-
(ln(w))MPE
(tr)MPE
exp∆w
j
jj ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
)5  (                   0]tr ∆w)),ln(w(1|j[JS Prob  1]tr ln(w),|j[JS Prob =+====
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coefficient in column j for variable k represents how the probability of outcome j changes 
for a marginal increase (or discrete change in case of dummy variables) in variable k. 
Thus, if a variable exerts a positive effect on job satisfaction, it must decrease the 
probability of reporting a low JS level and/or increase the probability of high JS. The 
MPEs are calculated at the sample mean of the continuous variables and for the reference 
individual.  
 
-------------------- Insert Table 4 about here ------------------- 
 
Most of the qualitative effects found in the data do not come as a surprise to the 
connoisseur of literature on job satisfaction. However, the results provide a novel view on 
the subject by breaking down these effects across outcomes of the JS distribution. In what 
follows, we discuss the main findings. 
 
4.1 Training and the determinants of JS 
 
As expected, labour earnings are closely related to overall JS. A 0.01 increase in 
logarithmic earnings (an approximately 1% increase in the level of earnings) decreases the 
probability of reporting the lowest satisfaction category (JS=1) by 0.094 percentage points 
(pp), and a similar effect is found for JS=2 (-0.078 pp). Conversely, a 1% increase in 
labour earnings significantly increases the probability of reporting JS=4 (0.151 pp) and 
JS=5 (0.029 pp). To make the results more meaningful, let us consider a 50% increase in 
earnings, which corresponds to a 0.4055 change in ln (monthly wage). In this case, the 
probability of JS=1 decreases by 9.4×0.4055=3.81 pp, while the probability of JS=4 rises 
by 6.08 pp. To put these effects in perspective, in the bottom of Table 4 we report the 
average probability of the different outcomes implied by the model. Thus, for example, we 
find that the average probability of outcome JS=1 (8.0%) decreases by almost a factor of 
two when the representative individual experiences a 50% increase in earnings. The same 
increase, however, does not change the likelihood of the remaining outcomes by more than 
one fifth of their average probability.   
 
The impact of the remaining variables is as follows. More educated workers are less 
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satisfied in their jobs. Specifically, having tertiary and secondary education raises the 
probability of reporting the lowest satisfaction level by between 2.0 and 2.5 pp. 
Conversely, the probability of full satisfaction decreases by 2.2 and 4.2 pp if the individual 
has upper secondary and tertiary education, respectively. Being employed in the public 
sector, having a supervisory role and working fewer hours significantly raise the 
probability of reporting high JS and/or decrease the probability of reporting low JS. Age 
does not significantly affect the probability of observing JS=1, although older workers are 
more prone to be moderately or fully satisfied in the job6. The likelihood of job 
dissatisfaction (low JS) decreases with a permanent contract and rises among immigrants 
and singles. Similarly, reporting bad health, previous unemployment episodes and living in 
a larger household are negatively related to JS. As expected, workers who receive health 
insurance or housing from the employer are more likely to be satisfied with their jobs, the 
former effect being more significant than the latter.  
 
All in all, these results are consistent with earlier studies indicating that JS is increasing in 
labour income, u-shaped in age, lower among singles and more educated individuals, and 
higher among public servants and workers with a permanent contract. The lower 
satisfaction found among individuals living in larger households, having health problems, 
and working more hours is also consistent with previous studies. As most of these results 
have long been discussed in the literature, we will not elaborate on them further7.  
 
Next, we turn to the training variables. We detect a differential effect on JS depending on 
whether or not the training is provided by the employer. Specifically, NEP training is 
innocuous in terms of JS: it does not significantly affect the probability of reporting low or 
high JS. In contrast, workers report higher levels of JS when they participate in EP 
programmes. This participation reduces the probability of JS=1 and JS=2 by 2.5 and 1.3 
pp, respectively, while increasing the probability of JS=4 by 4.7 pp. These effects are 
significant at the 5% level. It is worth noting that the training effect is not homogenous 
                                                 
6 Inspection of the linear and the quadratic term shows that the probability of JS=5 is decreasing until age 36 and 
increasing thereafter. This minimum takes place at age 41 when it comes to JS=4. 
7 See, for example, the comprehensive evidence reported in van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008). 
 
 
 16
across satisfaction levels. The negative, significant impact on the probability of outcome 
JS=1 does not switch to positive and significant in JS=5. This observation suggests that 
while EP training significantly reduces the probability that a worker is dissatisfied with the 
job, the same training does not induce the individual to be among the most satisfied 
workers. Indeed, a glance at Table 4 reveals that these asymmetric effects apply to most 
other covariates. For this reason, the next subsection is devoted to i) examining the extent 
of these asymmetries more accurately and ii) contextualizing the importance of EP training 
with regard to other covariates in different segments of the JS distribution. 
 
4.2 Asymmetric effects in the determinants of JS: satisfiers and dissatisfiers 
We find that some variables which are relevant to explaining low JS are not relevant to 
explaining high JS, and vice versa. This result is novel in the literature. Specifically, a 
glance at the last column of Table 4 reveals that working in the public sector (2.6 pp), age 
and age squared (-1.07 and 0.149 pp for a 1% increase, respectively), tenure (-1.9 pp for 
tenure between 5 and 10 years), housing and health insurance provided by the employer 
(2.2 and 1.9 pp, respectively) significantly affect the probability of an individual being 
fully satisfied in the job. These variables act, therefore, as satisfiers, because they are not 
relevant to explaining why some workers are not at all satisfied with their jobs. 
Conversely, hours of work, singlehood and firm size are dissatisfiers: they are not 
significantly related to outcomes JS=4 or JS=5, but turn out to be statistically significant 
for JS=1.  
  
To make the point more clear, in Table 5 we rank the determinants of high and low 
satisfaction according to their marginal effects and assuming a null effect for the variables 
that are not significant at the 10% level. For the logarithmic variables we consider the 
effect of a 50% increase on JS. This is intended to make the comparison between the 
categorical and the continuous variables more meaningful. For the purposes of our 
discussion, we exclude the Mundlak correction terms from the ranking. As is apparent, the 
rank of the different dimensions varies substantially across JS levels. Notwithstanding, 
certain profiles can be established. Some covariates have a higher rank when accounting 
for low JS than for high JS. Thus, for example, earnings (14th) and permanent contract 
(13th) rank very low in JS=5 but are, in contrast, amongst the most relevant dimensions 
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when accounting for JS=1 (3rd and 4th, respectively). Therefore, these variables act mostly 
as dissatisfiers. This is also the case of hours of work, singlehood and firm size. 
Conversely, the satisfiers can be characterized by increasing importance as we move 
towards higher JS levels. Among these, we include age, public sector, housing and health 
provided by the employer and, to a lower extent, tenure. Finally, a third group of variables 
(education, supervisory role, immigrant, bad health and unemployment experience) do not 
exhibit a clear pattern across JS levels. EP training can be included in this group for it 
ranks high (6th) among the determinants of JS=1 and JS=4 and low when accounting for 
JS=2 (11th) and JS=5 (15th). Still, if we restrict the analysis to the bottom and the top 
satisfaction levels, EP training acts as a dissatisfying rather than a satisfying factor. 
 
-------------------- Insert Table 5 about here ------------------- 
In Table B1 of Appendix B we report the MPEs implied by the OP model. In this case, the 
ratio of MPEs between the different covariates as well as the ranking of variables (last 
column) is constant across JS levels. In this setting, any given covariate is assumed to be 
as important for job satisfaction as for job dissatisfaction, thus eliminating, a priori, any 
possible distinction between satisfiers and dissatisfiers in the job. Whether or not to reject 
this hypothesis must be decided by globally testing the GOP against the OP. The null 
hypothesis is given by the restricted (OP) model, H0:  ββ j = for all j=1,…, J, while the 
alternative hypothesis corresponds to the unrestricted (GOP) model: H1:   ββ mj ≠ for 
some j ≠ m. The likelihood ratio test consists of calculating the difference times two 
between the log-likelihood value of the restricted and the unrestricted model. This statistic, 
reported in the bottom part of Table 4, follows a ji-square distribution with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of restrictions, (J-1)×K. According to its empirical value, 
522.6, the hypothesis of equality of coefficients across outcomes of the dependent variable 
must be rejected.  
 
4.3 The subjective value of EP training 
 
Now we can use the estimation results and Eq. (6) to determine the equivalent income of 
training activities. The calculation is not performed for NEP training given that, as seen 
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above, these activities are irrelevant to JS.  
 
Before proceeding, a remark is in order. Our estimating equation contains two distinct 
MPEs associated with earnings: (1) a direct effect, measured by the labour earnings 
coefficient, and (2) an indirect effect via the Mundlak correction term averaging earnings 
over an 8-year period. The first term measures the impact on JS of transitory changes in 
earnings; an effect that van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) call the shock effect. The 
second term, in turn, accounts for permanent, long-term changes in earnings, as it is 
associated with the average level of earnings over the sample period. While differentiating 
between transitory and permanent changes is potentially interesting, a glance at Table 4 
reveals that, in our case, the permanent effect fails to be statistically significant in all 
segments of the outcome distribution. For this reason we only consider the MPE of the 
shock effect in what follows.  
 
The results are reported in Table 6. The first row shows the percentage variation in wages 
needed to compensate the provision of EP training. The second row transforms this figure 
into euros using the sample average wage (€944.9) as the reference. All the estimates 
include a 95% confidence interval8.  
 
-------------------- Insert Table 6 about here ------------------- 
 
In the OP model (first column), the effect of training on JS is equivalent to a net monthly 
wage increase of 17.7%. For the sample average wage, this variation amounts to €166.8. 
This figure is the same for all workers, irrespective of their latent satisfaction level. In the 
GOP model, in turn, the trade-off ratio shows variation across segments of the JS 
distribution. In this case, training is not equally relevant for all workers: it is more valuable 
among workers with low latent satisfaction levels (JS=1 and JS=2) and among workers 
with moderately high satisfaction (JS=4). Specifically, the equivalent income measure 
amounts to a 30.5% variation in monthly earnings (€287.8) for JS=1, decreases to 18.2% 
                                                 
8 The equivalent income measure is a ratio of two distinct covariates. Therefore, we need to take into account the 
standard deviation of such a ratio in order to compute the confidence interval. This is done by using the “nonlinear 
combinations of estimators” option in STATA, which yields first and second moments of nonlinear combinations of the 
different covariates. 
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(€172.0) for outcome JS=2, and then rises to 36.1% (€341.4) for JS=4. The corresponding 
figure is not significantly different from zero in JS=5, thus confirming that (the lack of) EP 
training is not a relevant dimension among workers with high latent satisfaction levels. As 
neither income nor training are relevant to account for JS=3, we omit this category from 
the analysis9. 
 
To examine whether differences across segments of the JS distribution in the shadow value 
of training are relevant from a statistical point of view, we tested the GOP against the OP 
specification, now focussing exclusively on the income and training variables and 
disregarding the remaining covariates. Following the test, we rejected the hypothesis that 
the equivalent income of training is constant across JS levels10.  
 
4.3.1 Differences across training types 
 
Classifications 1A and 1B allow us to explore whether there exist relevant differences in 
the subjective valuation of different training schemes. The results are presented in Tables 7 
and 8. They are based on the MPEs reported in Table B2 of Appendix B.  
 
-------------------- Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here ------------------- 
 
Training activities attended on a full-time basis are only slightly more valuable than those 
attended part-time. On average, the difference is small (€177.8 vs. €159.2 in the OP 
model) although it can be larger among workers who are unsatisfied with their jobs 
(€337.5 vs. €252.1 for JS=1) and those who are moderately satisfied (€364.2 vs. €325.6 for 
JS=4). Table 8 differentiates between long- and short-term training activities. The results 
unambiguously show that short-term programmes are more valuable for workers. In the 
                                                 
9 This should come as no surprise. The fact that income is not relevant for the central outcome JS=3 is consistent with 
income being positively related to high JS and negatively related to low JS, with a similar reasoning applying to training.   
10 In this case, we do not test the GOP against the OP model globally. Rather, we focus on whether or not differences 
across outcomes are statistically significant only in the case of earnings and EP training. This is done by estimating a 
GOP model where the earnings and training effects are assumed to be constant across outcomes (null hypothesis). We 
then use the log-likelihood value of this restricted model to conduct the likelihood ratio test against our benchmark 
model. This statistic follows a ji-square distribution with (J-1)×2 degrees of freedom. The corresponding value, 26.7, 
falls again beyond the 99% confidence interval.  
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OP model, the subjective value of short training programmes amounts to a 32.6% wage 
increase (€308.4), and rises further in the GOP model among individuals who are not 
satisfied at all in the job (47.8% or €453.0). However, the highest valuation corresponds to 
workers who are moderately satisfied with the job, JS=4. In this case, the income 
compensation amounts to a 72.8% variation in the net monthly wage. 
 
In contrast, long-term training activities fail to be relevant for JS. Their equivalent income 
amounts to a negligible 6.5% of monthly earnings in the OP or, to put it differently, to 
€63.5. This compensation is not significant at conventional levels, with similar results 
found for the GOP. This finding may be surprising as it seems to contradict the intuition 
that investing in human capital for longer periods must yield larger gains. However, this 
may not be the case in light of previous research showing that training programmes may 
actually be more effective when they are shorter in length (Bassanini et al., 2005, pp. 125). 
Moreover, in many cases shorter courses are tailored to specific skill needs, based on 
specific contents, and aimed at improving and updating on-the-job skills, while longer 
programmes tend to be more general and less related to the current job (Budría and 
Pereira, 2007). The high valuation of short-term programmes would be consistent with 
workers appreciating more specific training with immediate purposes.   
 
5. Discussion 
 
We have found that EP training is a relevant dimension of JS. This is true even after 
controlling for a large set of job market and demographic characteristics, including labour 
earnings, education and tenure, and after controlling for individual (random) effects. We 
have provided a quantitative assessment on this issue by calculating the equivalent income 
of EP training. The estimates reveal some variation across individuals with low and high 
latent satisfaction levels and across training types. The average estimate provided by the 
OP model indicates that the importance of training for the worker would be equivalent to a 
17.7% increase in net monthly earnings.  
 
The first question that arises is whether this value, which amounts to a considerable sum, is 
credible. The estimate is quite impressive if we take into account that alternative methods 
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based on objective measures typically show lower benefits from training activities. The 
comprehensive evidence reported by the OECD (2004) and Bassanini et al. (2005) 
suggests that private returns to training (which are below 5% in most cases) are pyrrhic 
enough to consider training activities as being very relevant for the earnings prospects of 
workers. Most figures, however, are based on broad definitions of training. More 
meaningful comparisons can be made by considering studies that focus on firm-provided 
training. To name a few, in Parent (1999) and Blundell et al. (1999) the wage returns to 
training range from 3% to 12% depending on whether instrumental variables or fixed-
effects are used in the estimation. These returns are slightly lower in Pischke (2001), who 
finds that one year of full-time, work-related training increases wages by between 2.6% to 
3.8%. In Goux and Maurin (2000), an initial return of 7.1% drops to -5.7% after 
considering selectivity issues. In Leuven and Oosterbeek (2008), an initial 9.5% falls to a 
return that is close to zero when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. 
 
The main message from these estimates, which can be extended to other papers, is that 
returns to employer-provided training rarely lie within the two-digit realm. How does this 
evidence compare with a subjective appraisal? We must note that our estimates are already 
controlling for labour earnings. That is, the variation in JS due to an increase in earnings as 
a result of participation in a training programme is already netted out from the training 
coefficient. This coefficient therefore focuses on the intangible, non-pecuniary benefits of 
the programme, showing that training brings important benefits for the worker in addition 
to wage and productivity returns. More importantly, these subjective benefits are found to 
be remarkably larger than the objective ones.  
 
Is EP training worth almost 200 euros a month? 
There are at least two reasons why we consider that our estimates are not outrageous. First, 
there is evidence to suggest that as much as between 50% and 70% of the productivity 
effects from training are not realized by individuals, with firms extracting considerable 
rents from their human capital investments (OECD, 2004). The larger estimates found with 
the subjective method would be consistent with workers internalizing part of these firm 
effects.  
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The second explanation has to do with the concept of procedural utility suggesting that 
individuals not only value outcomes as usually assumed in economic theory, but also the 
conditions and processes leading to these outcomes (Frey et al., 2004). Training activities 
organized by employers are expected to improve opportunities for skill use within the firm, 
allowing workers to take advantage of their skills and valued abilities in an enriching 
environment of job content and task variation. Similarly, participation in EP training 
activities may allow workers to hold more attractive roles in the firm, improve their 
perceived social position, enhance self-respect and lead to higher recognition of job status 
and occupational prestige. These two dimensions (opportunity for skill use and valued 
social position) were identified by Warr (1994) as driving forces of JS. An additional 
factor pointed out by Warr is the opportunity of benefitting from supportive supervision. It 
is likely that participation in EP training is followed by periods of supportive management, 
participation in decision-making and improved support from the boss or employer, thus 
raising the worker’s perception of the job’s value. We found evidence to suggest that, 
taken together, these dimensions prove to be more relevant for JS than the potential 
earnings gains arising from training. 
 
A related finding is that workers with very low and moderately high satisfaction levels are 
more sensitive to (the lack of) training opportunities than workers who are very satisfied 
with their jobs. This finding just barely scratches the surface of how and to what extent 
individuals who are apparently equal but satisfied to different degrees may value training 
opportunities. Although testing for explanations is beyond the scope of this research, we 
may advance two candidate hypotheses. First, we are tempted to argue that the benefits of 
training in terms of opportunity for skill use, valued social position and supportive 
supervision are lower among individuals who are already very satisfied in the job. It is 
likely that workers in this group already hold jobs in which space for improvement in these 
terms is small, although we lack a theoretical framework to support this view.  
 
The second explanation refers to psychological employment contracts, which have recently 
gained increasing importance among human resource practicioners to understand the 
relationship between workers and firms (Rousseau and Wade-Benzoni, 1994). 
Psychological contracts are based on a set of expectations that employees have concerning 
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their firm as well as what the firm expects of their employees. Non-compliance or 
violation of a psychological contract signals that the parties to the contract no longer share 
a common set of values and objectives, leading employees to lower their level of 
commitment to the organization and engage in dysfunctional behaviour. Training policies, 
one of the most relevant domains of human resource management, may contribute to the 
reinforcement or incompliance of such contracts through the provision or under-provision 
of training opportunities. As far as training opportunities are concerned, the results suggest 
that workers with low satisfaction levels as well as moderately satisfied workers are more 
prone to see their psychological contract with the firm unfulfilled in the absence of training 
opportunities. Conversely, fully satisfied workers are more likely to feel more attached to 
the firm and to experience their jobs as more challenging and intrinsically rewarding. It is 
conceivable that the absence of training has a very limited impact on the job evaluation 
made by this group.  
 
Endogeneity and reverse causality  
An important question in this type of research is the direction of causality. Are trained 
workers more satisfied or more satisfied workers are more likely to get training? Similarly, 
it is arguable that JS and training are simultaneously determined, and that part of the 
estimated effect is due to a spurious relationship. Although these concerns are important 
and in some sense common in the literature, there are reasons to be pragmatic. First, the 
within-group component of the panel estimation is based on the observation of how the JS 
of the same people responds to changes in training participation over time. This implies 
that individual unobserved factors that may simultaneously affect JS and training (such as 
personality traits, productivity, commitment) have already been accounted for in the 
estimation.  
 
Second, the endogeneity of training is a common concern in the literature. Most of this 
concern, however, stems from research that focuses on wages and productivity, insofar as 
workers are likely to be selected (or self-selected) into training due to differences in 
potential productivity. Whether training participation is also mediated by JS levels is less 
apparent. Still, we cannot discard this possibility. To shed light on this issue, we conducted 
an exploratory exercise aimed to test whether periods of high JS are followed by increased 
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training participation. More specifically, we asked whether individuals who are more 
satisfied in the job at time t-1 are more likely to participate in EP training at time t. This 
was done by calculating the residual (unexplained) JS of each respondent from our 
benchmark JS equation and then estimating a training participation equation in which 
residual JS in the previous period and the usual socio-demographic characteristics were 
entered as regressors. Observations with missing values for the lagged residual were 
excluded from the estimating sample. The probit estimates, reported in Table C1 of 
Appendix C, seem to be at odds with the existence of reverse causality. Although 
positively related, previous JS fails to be statistically significant when accounting for 
training participation. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that individuals above the JS 
regression line (i.e., with higher residual JS) are as likely to participate in training as their 
less satisfied counterparts11. The same result holds when we considered residual JS at time 
t-2 and t-3, the average residual JS between t-3 and t-1, and when the monthly wage was 
included in the participation equation. Still, given the yearly basis of our data, we could 
not explore whether the response of training to JS takes place within the same year.  
 
Robustness of the results 
A final question regards the robustness of the estimates to changes in the set of controls 
included in the regressions. To isolate the effect of training on JS, a large number of 
covariates are considered in the paper. It may be argued, however, that some of the 
covariates are endogenous and that a more parsimonious specification would capture the 
‘true’ effect of training more appropriately. Thus, for example, if participation in EP 
training improves a worker’s chances of being offered a permanent contract or a 
supervisory role, the satisfaction effects of these covariates can be interpreted as benefits 
gained from the training itself rather than the benefits from having a permanent contract 
and a supervisory role. A similar reasoning applies to other variables, including tenure and 
working hours. Although these effects are more likely to operate in the opposite direction 
(i.e., participation in training is a consequence, not the cause, of certain job conditions) we 
conducted some sensitivity analyses.  
 
                                                 
11 The results for the remaining variables do not present surprises for the connoisseur of the literature: education, tenure, 
public sector, firm-size and permanent contract are positively related to the likelihood of training. 
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In computations not reported here, we estimated a set of four alternative equations ranging 
from our benchmark specification to a very parsimonious equation where earnings, 
education, age and training were the only controls. We found that as the number of 
regressors decreased, the implied shadow value of training increased. The maximum 
increase was some 30% in the simplest specification. Specifically, when moving from the 
benchmark model to the most parsimonious model, the shadow value of EP training rose 
from €166.8 to €223.1 in the OP. For full-time training the corresponding increase was 
from €177.8 to €235.4, while for part-time training it increased from €159.2 to €214.9, and 
from €308.4 to €356.9 for short-term training. Long-term training remained non-
significant and the results from the GOP presented similar variations. From this exercise 
we concluded that, first, the trade-off ratio between income and training implied by the JS 
equation is reasonably robust across alternative specifications and, second, that the 
estimates reported in the paper can be interpreted as a lower bound of a larger set of 
estimates.  
 
In parallel computations, we also explored whether the equivalent incomes changed much 
when using gross rather than net monthly earnings, and when switching from monthly to 
hourly earnings. The changes were not substantial, but pointed to slightly higher estimates 
with gross and hourly earnings. Additional encompassing tests showed no preference 
between the different earnings variables.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we used panel data to investigate the causal relationship between training and 
job satisfaction. We differentiated between employer-provided and non employer-provided 
training activities and found that while NEP training is not relevant for JS, EP training 
exerts a significant effect on workers’ JS. The results were used to provide pioneering 
estimates of the economic value that workers implicitly attribute to EP training.  
 
The results from the OP model were complemented with the estimation method proposed 
by Boes and Winkelmann (2009). This approach allowed us to differentiate between 
satisfiers and dissatisfiers in the job. We found that age, public sector employment and the 
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provision of housing and health insurance by the employer are more closely related to job 
satisfaction than to job dissatisfaction (satisfiers). Conversely, (low) earnings, hours of 
work, singlehood, (not having a) permanent contract and firm size were identified as 
dissatisfiers. EP training belongs to this second group, at least when the lowest and the 
highest satisfaction levels were considered.  
 
As a consequence of the existing asymmetries in the determinants of JS, the shadow value 
of training was found to differ across JS levels. More specifically, we found that EP training 
is very valuable among workers with low and moderately high latent JS and largely 
irrelevant for workers who are completely satisfied with their jobs. We differentiated 
between several types of training and found that short-term training spells are particularly 
rewarding.  
 
There are several policy implications arising from the results. First, recommendations 
regarding the expansion of training among the working population are typically based on 
estimates of wage and productivity returns. The results here suggest that these returns may 
largely understate the true benefits of training activities. While objective estimates 
typically yield very low returns, the subjective approach used in the paper shows that as far 
as JS is concerned, taking part in training schemes can, on average, be equivalent to a 
17.7% increase in earnings. This finding supports the notion that if enhancing JS among 
the workforce is a political goal, then the under-provision of training is greater than 
previously thought. 
 
Second, in the literature on High Performance Work Systems (HPWS), training is 
considered part of a larger package of human resource practices aimed at protecting and 
enhancing a firm’s investment in human capital. Much of the current debate centres on 
identifying what practices are more relevant along this dimension. The results in this paper 
suggest that EP training should be one of the pillars of a successful HPWS, insofar as it is 
closely related to JS among specific groups of workers. The results, moreover, can help 
employers design training programmes that are both effective and economical. We found 
that short training spells are particularly relevant for JS and that courses attended on a part-
time basis are roughly as rewarding as those attended full-time. Therefore, implementing 
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training schemes of this kind may help employers see their financial and emergent costs 
reduced. 
 
Thirdly, the results can encourage organizations to make full use of human capabilities and 
safeguard employees’ needs by paying more attention to psychological issues. From 
previous studies we know that dissatisfied workers are less productive, less loyal to the job 
and less cooperative. Our findings, which show that EP training is particularly rewarding 
among dissatisfied workers, suggest that training efforts directed towards this group may 
have a large effect on the average JS level in the firm. On the contrary, EP training 
programmes appear to have little impact on workers who are already very satisfied, thus 
suggesting that in order to retain and motivate this group, employers should rely on 
alternative compensation schemes.  
 
Finally, the paper suffers from some limitations that are worth noting. First, the 
information on training activities reported by participants in the ECHP is far from being 
perfect. Differentiating between long- and short-term training allowed us to control for the 
role of training intensity only partially. It would be very interesting to know how, and to 
what extent, the estimates change when the exact duration of the training spell and the 
number of courses attended are taken into account. Similarly, knowing whether the 
training is certified or not, general versus firm-specific or attended on site or off site, 
would yield interesting results. This information, however, is not available in most panel 
datasets. The results presented here should therefore be complemented with further 
research as new panel data providing more detailed information on EP training activities 
become available.  
 
As a second limitation, the paper does not attempt to ascertain whether the value of 
training differs across population groups. Participation in training schemes among specific 
workers may be more beneficial than would be expected from estimates based on the total 
working population. Differentiating between levels of education may give rise to 
interesting results in this regard. Previous research has shown that training interacts 
positively with formal education by increasing earnings and job opportunities. Although 
our results control for labour earnings, it is likely that educated individuals are more 
 28
sensitive to the (under-) provision of training activities due to existing synergies between 
education and recently acquired skills. Job satisfaction is also influenced by processes of 
social comparison and the perception of other worker’s situations and rewards (Clark et al., 
2009). To the extent that more educated individuals have more aspirations and expect 
more from jobs, the role of training among these groups is likely to exhibit a greater effect. 
Similarly, differences in tenure and gender may mediate the final impact that training has 
on JS. 
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Appendix A. Description of data source and estimating samples 
 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a sample of households and individuals who 
were interviewed annually from 1994 to 2001 in fifteen European countries. The results reported 
here are based on the Spanish subsample of the dataset. The following is a description of the 
variables used in the paper, including their original name in the ECHP (in parenthesis). 
 
EP training. Dummy, = 1 if the individual received training from the employer during the year, = 0 
otherwise (PT001, PT017) 
NEP training. Dummy, = 1 if the individual participated in training not provided by the employer 
during the year, = 0 otherwise (PT001, PT017) 
Ln (monthly wage). Natural logarithm of monthly net salary in the main job (PI211). 
Tertiary and Upper secondary education. Two dummy variables that are activated if the 
maximum level of education completed by the individual is, respectively, tertiary and upper 
secondary education. The ECHP includes only three education categories, less than upper 
secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary education. These education categories are constructed 
following the ISCED-97 classification (PT022). 
Public sector. Dummy variable,  = 1 if working in the public sector, = 0 otherwise (PE009). 
Supervisor. Dummy, = 1 if the individual has a supervisory role in his job, = 0 if he/she has an 
intermediate level or a non-supervisory role (PE010). 
Ln (hours of work). Natural logarithm of number of weekly hours including paid overtime in the 
main job or business (PE005A). 
Ln (age). Natural logarithm of age (PD003). 
Tenure. Defined as the difference between the year of the survey and the year of the start of the 
current job. Three categories were constructed: from 0 to 4 years, from 5 to 14 years, and 15 years 
or more (PE011). 
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Single. Dummy variable, = 1 if the individual is divorced, widowed, separated or never married, = 0 
if married or cohabiting (PD005). 
Immigrant. Dummy, = 1 if the individual was born in a foreign country, = 0 otherwise (PM001). 
Permanent contract. Dummy, = 1 if the individual has a permanent contract in the job, = 0 
otherwise (PE024). 
Firm size. Individuals are asked to report the number of employees that actually work in their firm. 
Four categories were constructed, from 1 to 19 employees, from 20 to 99 employees, from 100 to 
499 employees, and 500 employees or more (PE008). 
Badhealth. Individuals are asked to report their health status according to five categories, ranging 
from ‘very good’ to ‘very bad’. Badhealth is a dummy that activates when the answer is 1 (‘very 
bad’) or 2 (‘Bad’) (PH001). 
Unemployment experience. Dummy, = 1 if the individual experienced an unemployment period 
before his current job, = 0 otherwise (PE014) 
Health insurance provided by the employer. Dummy, = 1 if the employer provides health care or 
medical insurance, = 0 otherwise (PT027) 
Housing provided by the employer. Dummy, = 1 if the employer provides housing, = 0 otherwise 
(PT030). 
Ln (household size). Logarithm of the number of household members (HD001). 
Industry. Dummy. Takes the value 1 if the individual works in the industry sector, zero if he works 
in the service sector. The agricultural sector was dropped on the account of the particularities of this 
sector (PE007C) 
Occupation. A 9-point categorical variable transformed into 9 occupation dummies (PE006C). 
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Appendix B 
     Table B1. Marginal probability effects by level of JS – OP model 
1 2 3 4 5 Rank
EP training -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.006 ** 0.014 *** 0.014 ** 14
-2.55 -2.46 -2.29 2.54 2.37
NEP training 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.007 -0.007 19
0.84 0.86 0.90 -0.84 -0.87
Ln (monthly wage) -0.067 *** -0.068 *** -0.037 *** 0.088 *** 0.084 *** 4
-9.64 -9.64 -9.31 9.63 9.73
Tertiary education 0.022 *** 0.022 *** 0.012 *** -0.029 *** -0.028 *** 6
4.47 4.69 5.15 -4.53 -4.88
Upper secondary education 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.010 *** -0.025 *** -0.024 *** 10
4.48 4.71 5.22 -4.55 -4.93
Public sector -0.019 *** -0.020 *** -0.010 *** 0.025 *** 0.024 *** 9
-4.07 -3.86 -3.49 4.06 3.65
Supervisor -0.022 *** -0.022 *** -0.012 *** 0.029 *** 0.027 *** 7
-4.76 -4.44 -3.91 4.74 4.14
Ln (hours) 0.028 *** 0.028 *** 0.015 *** -0.036 *** -0.035 *** 13
2.74 2.74 2.73 -2.74 -2.74
Ln (age) 0.726 *** 0.740 *** 0.396 *** -0.954 *** -0.908 *** 1
5.42 5.44 5.39 -5.41 -5.47
Ln (age)^2 -0.100 *** -0.101 *** -0.054 *** 0.131 *** 0.125 *** 2
-5.36 -5.38 -5.34 5.35 5.41
5 ≤ Tenure < 10 0.010 ** 0.010 ** 0.005 ** -0.013 ** -0.012 ** 16
2.23 2.30 2.47 -2.25 -2.37
Tenure ≥ 10 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.003 19
-0.62 -0.62 -0.62 0.62 0.62
Single -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 0.008 0.008 19
-1.48 -1.46 -1.42 1.47 1.44
Immigrant 0.026 * 0.026 * 0.014 *** -0.034 * -0.032 ** 5
1.74 1.95 2.75 -1.81 -2.14
Permanent contract -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.011 *** 0.028 *** 0.027 *** 8
-5.95 -6.05 -6.15 5.98 6.15
20 ≤ Firmsize < 100 0.008 ** 0.008 ** 0.004 ** -0.011 ** -0.010 ** 18
2.39 2.43 2.51 -2.40 -2.47
100 ≤ Firmsize < 500 0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 19
0.82 0.83 0.85 -0.83 -0.84
Firmsize ≥ 500 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 19
-0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.11 0.11
Badhealth 0.036 *** 0.037 *** 0.020 *** -0.047 *** -0.045 *** 3
9.31 10.32 12.17 -9.66 -11.29
Unemployment experience 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.010 *** -0.025 *** -0.024 *** 11
5.52 5.66 5.84 -5.57 -5.76
Ln (household size) 0.024 ** 0.024 * 0.013 * -0.031 ** -0.030 * 15
-1.98 -1.88 -1.72 1.97 1.79
Housing provided by employer -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.007 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 12
-3.68 -3.67 -3.63 3.67 3.66
Health provided by employer -0.009 *** -0.010 *** -0.005 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 17
3.52 3.52 3.51 -3.52 -3.53
Mean (Ln(monthly wage)) 0.006 0.006 0.003 -0.008 -0.007 --
0.71 0.71 0.71 -0.71 -0.71
Mean (Ln(Hours)) -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 0.010 0.009 --
-0.48 -0.48 -0.48 0.48 0.48
Mean (Ln(Household size)) -0.019 ** -0.020 ** -0.011 ** 0.026 ** 0.024 ** --
-2.40 -2.40 -2.39 2.40 2.40
Average predicted Prob (JS=j) 0.085 0.160 0.267 0.374 0.115
Wald chi-square 1122.82 ***
Log likelihood -24914.60
No. of observations 17, 632
Job satisfaction
 
Notes to Table B1: i) standard errors are in smaller type; ii) * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% level; iii) 
additional controls: industry, 9 occupation dummies and year fixed effects. 
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Table B2. Marginal probability effects by level of JS – GOP model 
1 2 3 4 5
EP training, full-time -0.029 ** 0.003 -0.022 0.050 ** -0.001
-2.02 1.14 -1.10 2.30 -0.09
EP training, part-time -0.022 ** -0.022 ** 0.005 0.045 *** -0.006
-2.04 -1.99 0.29 2.68 -0.57
NEP training,  full-time -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.025 -0.010
-0.32 -0.21 -0.17 0.77 -0.47
NEP training,  part-time 0.003 0.001 0.033 -0.024 -0.013
0.24 0.06 1.54 -1.06 -0.85
Ln (monthly wage) -0.094 *** -0.079 *** -0.009 0.153 *** 0.029 ***
-8.51 -4.78 -0.43 6.97 2.06
Wald chi-square 1156.7
Log likelihood -24651.4
GOP against OP 525.8 ***
No. of observations 17,632
EP training, long term -0.017 -0.005 0.012 0.015 -0.005
-1.51 -1.34 0.72 0.82 -0.48
EP training, short term -0.037 *** -0.021 ** -0.024 0.083 *** -0.001
-2.67 -1.97 -1.23 4.17 -0.08
NEP training,  long term 0.004 -0.004 0.023 -0.008 -0.015
0.40 -0.31 1.23 -0.39 -1.08
NEP training,  short term -0.054 0.069 -0.002 -0.017 0.004
-1.33 1.32 -0.04 -0.34 0.15
Ln (monthly wage) -0.094 *** -0.079 *** -0.008 0.151 *** 0.029 **
-8.50 -4.78 -0.38 6.91 2.07
Wald chi-square 1155.4
Log likelihood -24647.4
GOP against OP 530.6 ***
No. of observations 17,632
Job satisfaction
 
Notes to Table B2: i) standard errors are in smaller type; ii) * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level; iii) additional controls: completed education, age (and squared), singlehood, 
immigrant status, health condition, unemployment experience, household size, public 
sector, supervisory role in the job, working hours, tenure, type of contract, firm size, 
housing and health insurance provided by the employer, three Mundlak correction terms, 
industry, 9 occupation dummies and year-fixed effects.  
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1. The determinants of training – Probit model 
Coeff. Coeff.
Residual JSt-1 0.023 Immigrant 0.258
1.18 1.32
Tertiary education 0.573 *** Permanent contract 0.306 ***
8.49 4.43
Upper secondary education 0.393 *** 20 ≤ Firmsize < 100 0.133 **
6.26 2.27
Public sector 0.160 ** 100 ≤ Firmsize < 500 0.280 ***
2.35 4.19
Supervisor 0.227 *** Firmsize ≥ 500 0.304 ***
3.52 4.67
Ln (hours) -0.162 Badhealth -0.131 **
-1.20 -2.07
Ln (age) 9.390 *** Unemployment experience 0.008
3.46 0.14
Ln (age)^2 -1.347 *** Ln (household size) -0.068
-3.63 -1.14
5 ≤ Tenure < 10 0.043 Housing provided by employer 0.314 ***
0.61 3.49
Tenure ≥ 10 0.276 *** Health provided by employer 0.272 ***
4.11 6.34
Single -0.202 ***
-2.88
Avg. predicted Prob (training=1) 0.095
Log likelihood -3364.99
No. of observations 12,682  
Notes to Table C1: i) standard errors are in smaller type; ii) * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% level; iii) 
additional controls: industry, 9 occupation dummies and year-fixed effects. 
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Tables 
 
 
 
      Table 1. The incidence of training – Classification 1A 
Full-time attendance Part-time attendance Total
EP training 0.034 0.058 0.092
NEP training 0.014 0.028 0.042
Total 0.048 0.086 0.134
 
 
 
 
      Table 2. The incidence of training – Classification 1B 
Long term Short term Total
EP training 0.050 0.042 0.092
NEP training 0.037 0.005 0.042
Total 0.087 0.047 0.134
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           Table 3. Summary statistics by level of job satisfaction 
Total 
Sample 1 2 3 4 5
Share 100 9.64 15.72 25.32 36.63 12.70
EP training 0.092 0.041 0.064 0.084 0.117 0.110
NEP training 0.042 0.048 0.041 0.044 0.041 0.038
Ln (monthly wage) 11.965 11.733 11.859 11.949 12.054 12.048
Tertiary education 0.255 0.190 0.198 0.246 0.298 0.271
Upper secondary education 0.196 0.220 0.202 0.203 0.188 0.181
≤Upper secondary education 0.549 0.591 0.601 0.552 0.514 0.548
Public sector 0.141 0.097 0.102 0.128 0.162 0.185
Supervisor 0.103 0.043 0.056 0.086 0.135 0.147
Ln (hours) 3.740 3.747 3.743 3.740 3.740 3.735
Ln (age) 3.689 3.646 3.668 3.688 3.704 3.728
Ln (age)^2 13.608 13.306 13.456 13.531 13.718 13.894
Tenure < 5 0.467 0.606 0.536 0.472 0.419 0.406
5 ≤ Tenure < 10 0.134 0.129 0.128 0.147 0.132 0.124
Tenure ≥ 10 0.399 0.264 0.336 0.382 0.449 0.470
Single 0.278 0.321 0.304 0.287 0.260 0.248
Immigrant 0.014 0.020 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.013
Permanent contract 0.604 0.436 0.531 0.605 0.662 0.653
Firmsize < 20 0.429 0.484 0.465 0.434 0.405 0.403
20 ≤ Firmsize < 100 0.270 0.284 0.282 0.269 0.266 0.257
100 ≤ Firmsize < 500 0.146 0.127 0.131 0.143 0.156 0.154
Firmsize ≥ 500 0.155 0.105 0.122 0.154 0.172 0.186
Badhealth 0.163 0.247 0.205 0.159 0.137 0.131
Unemployment experience 0.363 0.496 0.431 0.362 0.320 0.299
Housing provided by employer 0.036 0.021 0.024 0.035 0.040 0.055
Health provided by employer 0.475 0.390 0.440 0.466 0.497 0.535
Ln (household size) 1.247 1.287 1.259 1.232 1.242 1.245
Job satisfaction
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Table 4. Marginal probability effects by level of JS – GOP model 
1 2 3 4 5
EP training -0.025 *** -0.013 ** -0.004 0.047 *** -0.004
-2.80 -2.12 -0.34 3.36 -0.49
NEP training 0.000 0.000 0.021 -0.009 -0.012
-0.01 0.04 1.19 -0.47 -0.99
Ln (monthly wage) -0.094 *** -0.078 *** -0.008 0.151 *** 0.029 **
-8.50 -4.75 -0.39 6.91 2.06
Tertiary education 0.025 *** 0.006 0.009 0.002 -0.042 ***
3.52 0.62 0.80 0.16 -4.87
Upper secondary education 0.020 *** 0.014 * 0.013 -0.025 ** -0.022 ***
3.43 1.68 1.33 -2.31 -2.90
Public sector -0.011 -0.027 *** -0.016 0.027 ** 0.026 ***
-1.32 -2.56 -1.26 2.06 3.00
Supervisor -0.019 ** -0.041 *** -0.009 0.046 *** 0.022 ***
-2.02 -3.41 -0.62 3.20 2.48
Ln(hours) 0.046 *** -0.001 0.015 -0.025 -0.034
2.81 -0.06 0.47 -0.77 -1.64
Ln (age) 0.244 1.141 *** 0.900 *** -1.216 *** -1.070 ***
1.28 4.44 2.92 -3.52 -4.56
Ln (age)^2 -0.032 -0.156 *** -0.125 *** 0.164 *** 0.149 ***
-1.22 -4.39 -2.93 3.43 4.61
5 ≤ Tenure < 10 0.008 0.000 0.028 ** -0.017 -0.019 **
1.15 0.02 2.45 -1.39 -2.27
Tenure ≥ 10 -0.009 -0.003 0.001 0.020 * -0.009
-1.36 -0.40 0.07 1.80 -1.16
Single -0.019 *** -0.002 0.011 0.013 -0.003
-3.09 -0.22 1.13 1.17 -0.44
Immigrant 0.042 *** 0.007 0.033 -0.080 *** -0.002
2.48 0.32 1.14 -2.55 -0.10
Permanent contract -0.031 *** -0.021 *** 0.003 0.036 *** 0.012 *
-5.74 -2.81 0.32 3.52 1.78
20 ≤ Firmsize < 100 0.011 ** 0.010 -0.002 -0.012 -0.007
2.18 1.44 -0.25 -1.24 -1.11
100 ≤ Firmsize < 500 0.013 * 0.001 -0.007 -0.009 0.002
1.86 0.15 -0.62 -0.75 0.25
Firmsize ≥ 500 0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.009 0.006
-0.01 -0.18 0.41 -0.69 0.69
Badhealth 0.039 *** 0.048 *** 0.002 -0.059 *** -0.031 ***
7.64 6.57 0.25 -5.71 -4.39
Unemployment experience 0.019 *** 0.023 *** -0.002 -0.017 ** -0.022 ***
3.94 3.60 -0.30 -1.97 -3.58
Ln (household size) 0.029 ** 0.027 -0.022 -0.004 -0.030 **
2.46 1.62 -1.06 -0.17 -2.06
Housing provided by employer -0.010 -0.024 0.012 -0.001 0.022 *
-0.75 -1.41 0.60 -0.03 1.81
Health provided by employer -0.007 0.000 -0.012 * 0.000 0.019 ***
-1.60 0.00 -1.66 -0.02 3.80
Mean (Ln(monthly wage)) 0.009 -0.001 0.004 -0.016 0.004
0.70 -0.03 0.16 -0.63 0.22
Mean (Ln(Hours)) -0.006 0.022 -0.033 -0.015 0.032
-0.24 0.66 -0.80 -0.34 1.09
Mean (Ln(Household size)) -0.016 ** -0.023 ** 0.006 0.001 0.032 **
-2.17 -1.95 0.24 0.05 1.94
Average predicted Prob (JS=j) 0.080 0.159 0.269 0.374 0.118
Wald chi-square 1156.9 ***
Log likelihood -24653.3
GOP against OP 522.6 ***
Job satisfaction
 
Notes to Table 4: i) standard errors are in smaller type; ii) * denotes significance at the 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% level; iii) additional 
controls: industry, 9 occupation dummies and year-fixed effects. 
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Table 5. Rank of the determinants of low and high JS 
EP training 6 11 6 15 (n.s.)
NEP training 15 (n.s.) 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 15 (n.s.)
Ln (monthly wage) 3 5 4 14
Tertiary education 5 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 3
Upper secondary education 7 10 10 9
Public sector 15 (n.s.) 6 9 5
Supervisor 10 4 7 8
Ln (hours) 11 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 15 (n.s.)
Ln (age) 15 (n.s.) 1 1 1
Ln (age)^2 15 (n.s.) 2 3 2
5 ≤ Tenure < 10 15 (n.s.) 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 11
Tenure ≥ 10 15 (n.s.) 12 (n.s.) 11 15 (n.s.)
Single 8 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 15 (n.s.)
Immigrant 1 12 (n.s.) 2 15 (n.s.)
Permanent contract 4 9 8 13
20 ≤ Firmsize < 100 14 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 15 (n.s.)
100 ≤ Firmsize < 500 12 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 15 (n.s.)
Firmsize ≥ 500 15 (n.s.) 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 15 (n.s)
Badhealth 2 3 5 4
Unemployment experience 9 8 12 6
Ln (household size) 13 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 12
Housing provided by employer 15 (n.s.) 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 7
Health provided by employer 15 (n.s.) 12 (n.s.) 13 (n.s.) 10
JS=1
Low JS High JS
JS=2 JS=4 JS=5
 
Notes to Table 5: i) the ranking is constructed assuming a null effect for variables that are not 
significant at the 10% level. These variables are signalled by ‘n.s.’ (non-significant); ii) To 
make the comparison between categorical and logarithmic variables more meaningful, the 
impact of the continuous variables refers to a 50% increase.   
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Table 6. The subjective value of EP training, by level of JS 
OP
1 2 4 5
% wage variation 17.7% ***  [2.9%; 34.5%] 30.5% *** [7.3%; 58.7%] 18.2% ** [1.5%; 40.7%] 36.1% *** [11.5%; 66.1%] -13.3% [-51.5%; 55.1%]
 wage variation (in euros) 166.8 *** [27.2 €; 326.4 €] 287.8 *** [68.7 €; 554.4 €] 172.0 ** [14.2 €; 384.6€] 341.4 *** [108.2 €; 626.4 €] -125.4 [-486.7 €; 520.9 €]
GOP 
    Job satisfaction
 
Notes to Table 6: i) * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
Table 7. The subjective value of EP training (full-time versus part-time attendance), by level of JS 
1 2 4 5
% wage variation
Full-time attendance 18.8% * [-3.0%; 45.6%] 35.7% ** [0.1%; 83.9%] -3.1% [-39.3%; 54.2%] 38.5% ** [3.4%; 85.6%] -4.1% [-59.7%; 128.3%]
Part-time attendance 16.8% ** [-0.2%; 36.9%] 26.7% ** [0.3%; 59.9%] 32.2% ** [8.8%; 70.1%] 34.5% ** [6.6%; 69.5%] -17.9% [-59.5%; 66.5%]
wage variation (in euros)
Full-time attendance 177.8 * [-28.4 €; 430.4 €] 337.5 ** [1.3 €; 793.2 €] -29.6 [-370.3 €; 513.2 €] 364.2 ** [32.4 €; 808.6 €] -38.4 [-564.0 €; 1212.4€]
Part-time attendance 159.2 ** [-2.3 €; 348.3 €] 252.1 ** [3.1 €; 566.4 €] 304.2 ** [83.2 €; 662.4 €] 325.6 ** [62.7 €; 657.0 €] -168.9 [-562.2 €; 628.7 €]
GOP 
    Job satisfactionOP
 
Notes to Table 7: i) * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1%  level 
 
 
Table 8. The subjective value of EP training (long term versus short term) by level of JS 
1 2 4 5
% wage variation
Long term 6.5% [-9.8%; 26.3%] 19.6% [-5.5%; 51.5%] 6.7% [-26.2%; 53.6%] 10.1% [-12.7%; 39.1%] -16.6% [-60.9%; 78.1%]
Short term 32.6% *** [9.7%; 60.5%] 47.8% *** [9.3%; 99.7%] 31.5% ** [8.0%; 77.5%] 72.8% ** [27.3%; 132.0%] -3.0% [-55.2%; 110.1%]
wage variation (in euros)
Long term 63.5 [-92.5 €; 248.0 €] 184.8 [-52.2 €; 486.1 €] 63.7 [-247.6 €; 506.3 €] 96.2 [-120.1 €; 369.4 €] -156.0 [-575.3 €; 738.9 €]
Short term 308.4 *** [91.2 €; 571.3 €] 453.0 *** [88.1 €; 942.5 €] 297.9 ** [75.6 €; 732.3 €] 679.4 **
*
[258.2 €; 1248.1 €] -28.5 [-541.8.0 €; 1039.9 €]
GOP 
    Job satisfactionOP
 
Notes to Table 8: i) * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% level 
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Figures  
Figure 1. Distribution of JS by training groups (%) 
Panel a. Participants in EP training  
Panel b. Participants in NEP training 
Panel c. Workers with no training 
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